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1Abstract
This paper outlines issues and challenges in analyzing the impact of 
regulations/standards on agri-food trade. The discussion will elaborate on two aspects 
of the program of research on NTMs: (a) linking economic analysis of agri-food trade 
impacts to specific research questions – impact of public regulations versus private 
standards, costs and benefits of regulatory measures, and how to integrate risk 
assessment in the analysis; (b) an introduction to discussion of data selection and 
methods to analyze the impact of NTMs such as regulations and standards in 
particular. This overview will set the stage for the ensuing three presentations.
The analytical framework is developed within the EU NTM-Impact project (FP7 
KBBE.2008.1.4.05) which foresees data selection and preparation for case studies and 
a comparative aggregate analysis, focusing on EU agri-food trade.
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31 Introduction
This paper presents a framework for analyzing the impact of regulations and standards 
on EU agri-food trade. It is based on the EU NTM-Impact project (FP7 
KBBE.2008.1.4.05) whose overall objective is to collect and analyze new data on 
non-tariff measures (NTMs), particularly on governmental regulations and private 
standards that prescribe the conditions for importing agri-food products into the
market of the European Union (EU) and into the markets of the main competing 
players. The overall aim of the framework that constitutes the first step towards the 
analyses planned in the NTM-Impact project is to provide guidelines on country and 
product choice and the selection of specific regulatory measures, as well as to bring 
together state-of-the-art methodologies and the specific research questions targeted in 
a systematic way. The analytical framework elaborates on two important aspects: 
First, sound economic analysis of the impact of regulations and standards on agri-food
trade is linked to the specific research questions of the different analyses within the 
NTM-Impact project, considering specifically public regulations versus private 
standards, costs and benefits of regulatory measures as well as risk assessment. 
Second, issues of data selection and methods to analyze the impact of NTMs in 
general and regulations and standards in particular are discussed.
NTMs are usefully defined as policy measures other than customs tariffs that can 
potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing 
quantities traded, prices, or both (MAST 2008). The project’s focus is on an important 
subset of NTMs which are governmental regulations and private standards. 
Understanding regulations and standards as instruments correcting for market 
imperfections and inefficiencies which are associated with production, distribution, 
and consumption of agri-food products, the project will adapt the MAST (2008) 
classification system of regulations and standards, including the following categories 
of measures: Sanitary and phytosanitary measures and their conformity assessment 
(A200, A300), technical barriers to trade and their conformity assessment (B200, 
B300), and pre-shipment inspection and other formalities (C000). Furthermore, 
private standards on sanitary and phytosanitary (A100) and on technical barriers to 
trade (B100) issues are in the focus of interest when considering the impacts from EU 
and trade partner NTMs on least developed country (LDC) exports.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the main issues of NTMs with 
regard to agri-food trade. The third section addresses different methods of measuring 
the size of NTMs and presents different indicators, differentiating between count 
measures and stringency measures. Section 4 discusses options for the collection of 
data on NTMs for the central database which will be developed within the project.
The fifth section summarizes the essence of scientific knowledge regarding impact 
assessment of regulatory measures on agri-food trade and covers measurement 
challenges for analyzing their impacts in case studies on different product-trade 
clusters. Section 6 concludes by bringing together the analytical focus and
quantification techniques of NTM measurement.
2 Issues of regulations and standards
NTMs such as regulations and standards have been used to address information 
problems and externalities that are related to societal concerns and cause market 
failure. Public regulations define minimum food safety and quality requirements, 
leaving market actors to define private standards that go beyond this minimum. The 
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distribution systems induce food safety and quality demands which go beyond public 
regulations. Private standards may satisfy the extended demand for food safety and 
quality. While having a long tradition in regulating domestic agri-food production, 
regulations and standards also prescribe import conditions and have become 
increasingly important in international agri-food trade. In the trade context, public 
regulations that impose import requirements on foreign producers or rather exporters 
fall under the multilateral trade rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), more 
specifically the technical barriers to trade (TBT) and the sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) agreement. Private standards in agri-food trade are not subject to the WTO 
rules. While encouraging governments to orientate their import requirements for 
foreign products towards internationally agreed regulations, the WTO rules maintain 
the right and obligation of countries to impose their own regulations as long as they 
are non-arbitrary, nondiscriminatory and least trade-restricting. Providing public 
goods and facilitating exchange through various means of lowering transaction costs 
are the important justifications for public agri-food trade regulations (Josling et al. 
2004). Minimizing trade related risks, product and product-related process 
requirements ensure public goods such as food safety, animal, plant, and human life 
and health but also extend to other quality and technical aspects. With regulations and 
standards in place, information problems due to product attributes that cannot be 
directly identified by consumers can be overcome, solving asymmetric information 
issues between producers and consumers as well as improving the functioning of the 
market.
With regard to NTMs, market access and competitiveness is the major issue from the 
perspective of exporters. Despite international coordination and the development of 
global regulations and standards and common conformity assessment under the 
institutions like the Codex Alimentarius, the World Organization for Animal Health 
(OIE), and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) which all are 
recognized in the WTO trade rules, import regulations continue to differ from country 
to country, and governments demand that foreign products comply with their 
requirements. Exporters have to comply with requirements demanded by importing 
countries and those supplying multiple markets are usually confronted with a 
patchwork of regulations and standards. The capacity to comply with internationally 
differing requirements is a crucial issue in assessing the impact of regulatory 
measures on the exporting countries’ competitiveness.
Regulations and standards impose compliance costs on producers that wish to supply 
foreign markets and can undermine exporters’ comparative advantages in trade. In 
addition to the relative stringency of regulatory measures that importing countries 
impose on foreign products, country-specific and sector-specific factors, such as 
infrastructure, administrative services and market structure for example, influence 
compliance costs and thus the magnitude of the impact regulatory measures may have. 
While causing costs, import requirements may also bring about benefits for both 
consumers and producers, and they should be considered in a balanced analysis. 
Information on the benefits of regulatory measures such as productivity and efficiency 
gains, better co-ordination and compatibility between links in the supply chain, as 
well as increased consumer demand is by large missing. Consumers’ benefit from 
regulatory measures is usually measured in terms of their willingness to pay for rules
compliant products. If export products are produced according to certain regulations 
and standards their demand may increase, and buyers may be willing to pay a higher 
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even relatively strict import requirements in order to gain access to high-value 
markets. That is, the profits that exporters can make on the market of the importing 
country may compensate for their costs of meeting the potentially strict import 
requirements. As such, regulations and standards do not necessarily restrict trade, and 
in their presence trade flows may even increase.
Looking at the impact of regulatory issues on the cost structure of producers, a 
differentiation between fixed (through investment) and variable (through additional 
activities and process requirements) compliance costs matters. The distinction 
between fixed and variable costs raises the issue of decomposing the impact of 
regulatory measures on trade into an intensive and extensive margin. Variable 
compliance costs on the one hand determine the firms’ volume of exports (intensive 
margin), and on the other hand fixed compliance costs determine whether firms export 
to a given market (extensive margin). Variable and fixed compliance costs weigh 
differently for different types of producers. The relation between variable and fixed 
trade costs in general and firms’ productivity characteristics have been established in 
recent advance of international trade theory, leading to heterogeneous firm models
(Helpman et al. 2008).
A further issue that is discussed in the literature is how tight import requirements of 
developed countries affect particularly agri-food exports from developing and least 
developed countries (LDCs). Meeting and confirming compliance with them can pose 
difficulties and in many cases insurmountable challenges for agri-food producers and 
exporters in developing countries, typically characterized by small and medium 
enterprises. With their possibly substantial restriction of export opportunities, import 
requirements demanded by developed countries may have extensive economic 
implications. However, suppliers of developing countries fulfilling the requirements 
can benefit from supplying markets of developed countries with tight regulations and 
standards as potentially substantial gains can be had. Particularly for development 
purposes, a better understanding of the role of import conditions on exports from 
developing countries is necessary to better target technical assistance efforts in these 
countries and to consider potential policy changes so as to further facilitate their trade 
activities.
3 Identification and measurement of regulatory measures
A number of methods related to the measurement of regulations and standards exist 
which can be used for quantitative analysis. First, regulations and standards are 
measured using various count measures. Usually, a binary choice variable is used that 
is assigned the value of one if a country-pair, product, and year specific trade flow is 
subject to a regulatory measure and zero otherwise. This binary choice variable 
presents the base for preparing frequency and coverage type measures. Alternatively, 
the number of documents or pages describing regulatory measures is counted. Second, 
regulations and standards are measured through the stringency of their requirements. 
In several contributions stringency has been derived directly from the requirement, in 
particular for measures that contain ordinal or cardinal elements such that they can be 
ranked on an objective scale, e.g. tolerance limits for residues and contaminants. One 
possible method for measuring the stringency of import requirements going beyond 
this direct approach is to derive tariff equivalents which determine the equivalent 
tariff rate that reproduces the changed import level and the altered domestic prices 
induced by the respective measures. Another method is to make tools operational 
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thus provide information on regulations’ and standards’ stringency in terms of policy 
heterogeneity.
3.1 Count measures
Frequency measures count the number of regulatory measures or the proportion of 
products or tariff lines that are subject to regulations and standards within a given 
product classification. Coverage measures calculate the volume or value of imported 
goods subject to standards and regulations and are usually expressed as a percentage 
of the total imports in that product category or tariff line.1 Few studies systematically 
apply frequency and import coverage measures to identify the size of regulatory 
measures. Fontagné, von Kirchbach, and Mimouni (2005) use NTM notification data 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Trade 
Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) to calculate the import coverage index 
which is the ratio of notifying country imports to total world imports for groups of 
NTMs applied for different risk-reducing regulatory goals. Most studies estimating 
the trade impact of multiple regulatory measures in econometric models rely on 
frequency and coverage ratios. Examples are Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008), 
de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006), Fontagné, Mimouni, and Pasteels (2005), and 
Moenius (2004).
The main advantage of frequency and coverage measures is their calculative 
simplicity. The only information being necessary is the product (tariff line) and 
country specific knowledge on the existence of regulatory measures. The content of 
the specific requirements is not considered. The calculative simplicity attracts a 
number of criticisms. Regulatory measures are complex and impact different product 
groups and different countries in different ways. There is little agreement on how to 
weight the importance of different standards in calculating an aggregate measure of 
their stringency, indicating their possible impact on trade. It is questionable whether it 
makes sense at all to calculate the trade impact over an aggregate of all measures. 
Regulatory measures have an ambiguous impact on trade: regulations may be trade 
restricting, trade promoting or may have no trade impact at all – a strong tendency 
cannot be made out from results of an aggregate level (Schlueter et al. 2009). A 
simple aggregation is not able to identify the potential benefits and downsides of 
regulations simultaneously. Another drawback of count measures is that the mere 
existence of regulatory measures does not imply their appropriate implementation and 
enforcement. Without proper enforcement, regulations and standards may not be 
effective and the trade impact is not measureable meaningfully. A third problem stems 
from the fact that the import coverage ratios should be calculated by using the total 
trade value or volume once standards and regulations are totally removed (Deardorff 
and Stern 1997). As in practice this information cannot be provided the observed and 
therefore NTM-biased value or volume of imports is typically used. Despite the above 
mentioned problems, count measures are often used in the applied literature.
3.2 Stringency measures
The stringency of regulations and standards can be measured directly if cardinal or 
ordinal elements are part of the measures defining the degree of the NTM. This 
1 Korinek et al. (2008) provide a detailed discussion on advantages and disadvantages of frequency and 
coverage measures as well as give an overview on existing databases. A review of the current 
literature is also provided.
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and contaminants, or the duration of a quarantine measure. For example Wilson and 
Otsuki (2001) and Otsuki et al. (2001) estimate the impact of a maximum residue 
level for aflatoxin on trade in different products like cereals, nuts, dried fruits, and 
vegetables which are mostly exported from African countries into the EU. Due to 
difficulties in assessing directly the stringency of measures regulating or controlling 
production processes or conformity assessment, the use of the direct approach is
however limited.
A measure which allocates a numerical element to an aggregate of regulations and 
standards is the tariff equivalent.2 It is based on the idea that regulatory measures 
impact trade indirectly by changing the transaction costs of trade. As regulatory 
measures can increase and decrease transaction costs, tariff equivalents can be 
positive as well as negative accounting for the costs as well as for the benefits of 
regulations and standards (Marette and Beghin forthcoming). This, ceteris paribus, 
changes domestic prices in the importing country relative to world market prices 
without regulatory measures, creating a price effect similar to that which arises when 
an import tariff is imposed. One way to obtain tariff equivalents is to estimate the 
quantity impact of regulations and standards on trade and then transform the quantity 
effect via elasticities into a price effect what is referred as an ad-valorem equivalent of 
NTMs (Kee et al. 2006). However, tariff equivalents of prohibitive regulatory 
measures cannot be measured by this approach. Looking at trade and welfare effects 
of systematically prohibitive policies, Yue and Beghin (2009) propose a method 
overcoming the lack of observed data on bilateral trade flows which is based on a 
Kuhn-Tucker approach to corner solutions in consumer choice. Other methods 
directly concentrate on the price effect and in this case tariff equivalents are, for 
example, derived by careful price comparison (handy-craft price gap method). In 
order to obtain appropriate estimates of the price effect, influences on the domestic 
price unrelated to NTMs such as tariffs, taxes, transportation costs or multilateral 
resistance need to be corrected for. Although tariff equivalents intuitively illustrate the 
size of NTMs by allocating prices, there are a number of difficulties associated with 
implementing them for measuring the impact of regulatory measures on trade. Tariff 
equivalents are calculated for an aggregate of standards and regulations subject to a 
product or a product group. This makes it impossible to identify and separate the 
impact of different regulatory measures which may simultaneously influence trade. 
Another drawback relates to the amount of necessary information which is not readily 
available and usually difficult to obtain. As already mentioned above, the price effect 
induced by regulatory measures has to be separated from other impacts of potential 
determinants affecting trade flows, and in order to make the necessary corrections 
additional information is needed. Furthermore, when determining tariff equivalents 
for NTMs the assumption of perfect competition is most often used (Bhagwati 1965). 
While perfect competition may approximate the market structure of some agri-food 
industries, the existence of regulations and standards which provide differentiation in 
products and may result in imperfect markets renders calculating tariff equivalents for 
regulations and standards difficult.
Another method takes advantage of differences in regulatory measures between 
countries, assessing the stringency of regulatory measures in relative terms. The idea 
2 Korinek et al. (2008) provide a detailed discussion on standards and regulations as tariff equivalents 
and give an overview on literature.
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entry if the measure requires exporting firms to incur additional market entry cost. 
From this perspective, the differences between the home regulation and the import 
requirement matter more than the absolute degree of regulation. Nardo et al. (2005) 
and Kox and Lejour (2005) have prepared a methodology to develop an indicator of 
policy heterogeneity. It is based on a detailed comparison of import requirements for 
specific characteristics of products and production processes for individual country 
pairs. If a country pair has a different policy in place the assigned dissimilarity value 
is one, and zero otherwise, yielding in binary information per policy item. This is 
repeated for each policy item and product, before averaging the values and yielding a 
policy heterogeneity indicator for each country pair for example, or a country 
deviancy indicator showing the dissimilarity in regulations of one country in 
comparison to all other countries. Kox and Nordås (2007) find that regulatory 
heterogeneity has a negative impact on market entry and subsequent trade flows. 
Furthermore they argue that the impact of regulations in services trade differs from 
manufactures trade because the delivery of services in a foreign market requires the 
presence of firms with staff and capital in the foreign country. Hence, firms entering 
the foreign market must comply with multiple full sets of regulations regarding 
entrepreneurial activity, human and capital resources – at home and abroad.
4 Options for the collection of data on regulatory measures
The objective of the central database of NTM-Impact is to collect, store and make 
accessible a set of data on pre-selected governmental regulations for a selected set of 
agri-food products. In defining what criteria support the decision on what NTMs to 
include into the central database, two possible leads for criterion development are 
pursued. First, the products and sectors of key interest to EU export performance; and 
second, material on concerns and issues from the Market Access Database (MADB).
Product selection is a major element in the definition of the scope of the NTM-Impact
database as regulations in agri-food trade differ in their coverage across products. The 
discussion below provides preliminary suggestions for the development of criteria for 
product selection. A distinction is made between plant and animal products, as there 
are extensive differences in regulation between plant and animal products. Product 
selection must follow the interest of analyzing the impact of regulatory differences on 
agri-food trade between the EU and its ten main export competitors. It is suggested to 
define two sets of products. Set 1 comprises the main EU export products with high 
trade volumes. The following options are identified: (1) Incumbents: Top major EU 
export products 1998-2007 to 10 exports markets; (2) Rising stars: Top fastest 
growing export products; (3) Potentials: Top major export products to alternative 
export destinations. Set 2 comprises products for which regulatory differences are 
perceived as obstacles where the key concerns are the following: (1) Food safety; (2) 
Animal health; (3) Plant health; (4) Protect humans from animal/plant pests or 
diseases.
The other main element in defining the scope of the NTM database is material on 
concerns and issues from the EU Market Access Database (MADB). It is immediately 
clear from the Trade Barriers section of MADB that technical measures are the main 
barriers recorded in the database. Over 75 percent of barriers listed are technical 
measures; almost 60 percent are SPS measures (NTM code A000), 10 percent are 
technical barriers to trade (NTM code B000) and 8 percent are other technical 
measures (NTM code C000). For more details on SPS measures, the MADB has a 
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database. The same records that appear in the Trade Barriers section appear yet with 
additional classifications and search facilities regarding measures, products and 
countries. There is no one-to-one match however, as the Trade Barriers section lists 
12 more SPS-related barriers than the SPS database. Over 60 percent of all entries in 
the SPS database are on animal health related issues, about 15 percent are on food 
safety issues and 25 percent are on miscellaneous issues. This distribution of problems 
does not appear proportional to the amount of problems encountered nor of the 
volumes of trade; rather is it likely that the dataset contains biases towards types of 
sectors or issues.
In constructing the central database, the NTM-Impact project takes the idea of policy 
heterogeneity, and develops it further for the purpose of analyzing the impact of 
regulations and standards as nontariff measures in agri-food exports of the EU. The
database will contain count measures as well as stringency measures concentrating on 
governmental regulations. If feasible, cardinal or ordinal numbers are included into 
the database following the direct approach. Based on the idea of the policy 
heterogeneity approach, methods to compare import requirements measure-by-
measure across products and countries will be conceptually and mathematically 
developed within NTM-Impact. The database will serve two purposes. First, it will be 
instrumental in providing an overview of NTMs in EU agri-food exports. The 
perspective is that agricultural products are generally exported after successfully 
completing an approval process by the importing country. The database will indicate 
that the likelihood of getting approval differs across countries and products. Despite 
the presence of the Market Access Database and other relevant sets of data, the 
European Commission currently lacks such an overview. Second, it facilitates a 
comparison of import requirements imposed on EU exports to the recommended 
international standards (Codex, OIE, IPPC), against a benchmark of import 
requirements for products imported into the EU market. To start with, a template will 
be developed that lists all relevant EU requirements and the recommended 
international regulations, if available, and provides a coding system for products, 
regulatory measures, and time. On the basis of the template, data sampling teams will 
collect raw data (pdf or text files of legislation, import manuals) on the most recent 
import requirements for the ten most important EU export competitors, which are 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and 
the USA. Regulatory measures at the most specific level are extracted out of these 
documents, including ordinal and cardinal data. The classification of regulations 
follows the MAST (2008) classification of NTMs, including the following categories 
of measures: Sanitary and phytosanitary measures and their conformity assessment 
(A200, A300), technical barriers to trade and their conformity assessment (B200, 
B300), and pre-shipment inspection and other formalities (C000). Figure 1 shows how 
the raw data on regulations is inserted into the classification system, where economic 
regulation means a measure implemented directly for risk reduction and safety 
assurance purposes, while administrative regulation means the associated tests to be 
done that prove that the requirement is met such as conformity assessment measures.
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5 Determining the impact of regulatory measures in case studies
It can be thought of many possible situations where import requirements can increase 
trade and welfare, decrease it or leave it unaltered. The trade and welfare effect of 
regulations and standards is therefore a priory unclear. This makes the question about 
how regulatory measures affect trade flows and countries’ welfare first and foremost 
an empirical one. Therefore the following section concentrates on methods measuring 
the impacts of regulatory measures on countries’ trade flows and on their welfare.
These methods can be applied in different case studies within the NTM-Impact 
project which are formulated for different product-trade clusters. Two sets of case 
studies can be differentiated: First, product-trade clusters which are designed to 
analyze relative non-tariff measures on imports from the EU compared to other major 
players exporting the same product; these case studies address the relative 
competitiveness of EU exporters compared to its main competitors. Second, product-
trade clusters which analyze the implications of NTMs in the EU and other high 
income countries for developing countries; one case study deals here with private 
standards versus public regulations, and four case studies concentrate on the 
development impact of NTMs.
5.1 Econometric models
Econometric studies analyzing the impact of NTMs are based on the gravity model 
which describes bilateral trade flows by a function of exporter and importer gross 
domestic product (GDP) and world GDP (Deardorff 1998). Under the assumption of 
trade frictions the assessment of impacts of any form of tariff or non-tariff barriers is 
allowed, including regulatory measures, by integrating different relevant variables 
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potentially leading to “distance” between countries. Generally gravity models ask for 
the impact of NTMs on (bilateral) trade flows. They consider the foregone trade that 
cannot be explained by tariffs and other potential explanatory variables. As such they 
do not only consider the trade volume per exporter, but also take into account the 
number of trade relationships. This is of major importance as on a product-specific 
level many potential trade relationships do not come about, thus trade flows are zero. 
The application of gravity models goes back to Tinbergen (1962) who did the first 
econometric studies by testing the hypothesis whether economies’ sizes and the 
distance between trading partners are the most relevant explanatory variables for 
determining the normal pattern of international trade which would prevail when 
discriminatory trade burdens were absent. The essential assumption of product 
differentiation for deriving a theory-consistent gravity equation can either be obtained 
by Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory where trade is impeded and factor prices are not 
equalized as in Deardorff (1998), by Armington-like specifications assuming 
differentiation by country of origin as in Anderson (1979) and Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), by Ricardian elements as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), or by 
monopolistic competition and increasing returns as in Redding and Venables (2004).
Gravity models are quantity-based econometric models. Contrary to simulation 
models which utilize price terms directly, gravity models include price-terms only 
implicitly which present a function of observable and unobservable variables. As such 
gravity models do not provide welfare economics, but the estimated trade flow impact 
can be transformed into price effects via elasticities to obtain tariff equivalents.
Even though the literature of applied economics discusses several methods of 
quantifying trade barriers,3 gravity models seem to be one of the most appropriate 
methods to measure effects of specific technical regulations while using the cross-
sectional richness of trade data. Gravity models of various levels of detail have been 
used to provide evidence on the trade impact of regulatory measures, whereby some 
studies take the estimates to derive price effects in terms of tariff equivalents and 
welfare effects. Gravity studies analyzing the aggregate impact of regulatory measures 
by using frequency and coverage ratios are for example Disdier, Fontagné and 
Mimouni (2008), de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006), Fontagné, Mimouni and Pasteels 
(2005), and Moenius (2004). In contrast, Wilson and Otsuki (2001) and Otsuki, 
Wilson and Sewadeh (2001) analyze single standards or sector- or product-specific 
regulations whose stringency is measured on an absolute maximum residual level
following the direct approach. Kox and Nordås (2007) follow the policy heterogeneity 
approach for explaining service trade among EU countries. Moenius (2004) and 
Fontagné, Mimouni and Pasteels (2005) find out that a positive trade effect prevails in 
the manufacturing sector and for processed agricultural products, while the trade 
effect is negative for other products. Exports from developing and least developed 
countries are negatively affected (Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni 2008, Wilson and 
Otsuki 2001, Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh 2001) whereas trade between OECD 
countries is not significantly influenced by regulatory measures (Disdier, Fontagné 
and Mimouni 2008). The impact of regulations in services trade differs from 
manufactures trade because the delivery of services in a foreign market requires the 
presence of firms with staff and capital in the foreign country, forcing firms entering 
3 See Cipollina and Salvatici (2008), Ferrantino (2006), Bora et al. (2002), Beghin and Bureau (2001), 
and Deardorff and Stern (1997).
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the foreign market to comply with multiple sets of regulations and standards (Kox and 
Nordås 2007).
Several estimation techniques have been applied in the literature. Estimators differ in
their consistency and efficiency, whereby the following challenges in estimation have 
been identified: (1) Many potential trade relationships on a product-specific level are 
not existent. Standard sample selection bias may result from the need to drop the
observations with zero trade flows when log-linearizing the gravity equation 
(Helpman et al. 2008, Silva and Tenreyro 2006). (2) Potential unobserved firm level 
heterogeneity caused by an omitted variable which measures the impact of the number 
of exporting firms may produce biased estimates, i.e. the intensive and extensive 
margin of the trade impact of trade frictions has to be taken into account (Silva and 
Tenreyro 20084, Helpman et al. 2008). (3) Trade is determined by relative trade 
barriers. Omitting unobserved country-pair heterogeneity such as multilateral 
resistance may cause biased estimates (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006, Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2003). (4) Heteroscedasticity may be present in trade data (Martin and Pham 
2008, Silva and Tenreyro 2006).5 A choice of estimators and models used in gravity 
literature is: least squares, non-linear least squares, fixed effects and random effects 
estimation, binary choice estimation, Hausman-Taylor estimation, two-stage 
estimation procedures, and pseudo maximum likelihood estimation.
5.2 Simulation models
Simulation models have been used in the applied trade analysis of NTMs in general 
and regulations and standards in particular. Since simulation models are firmly rooted 
in microeconomic theory they are useful tools for a systematic and economically 
sound analysis. More specifically, the trade impact and possibly further reaching 
economic effects are derived accordingly. In two-country simulation models, the trade 
restricting and facilitating impact of regulatory measures between respective trading 
countries can be analyzed. When including at least three countries (multi-country 
models), the analysis can capture possible trade diversion effects due to regulations
and standards that on the one hand differ across countries and on the other hand affect 
trading partners differently. Simulation analysis in particular shows the trade-off 
between negative and positive effects of regulatory measures, and employing common 
welfare indicators, simulation analysis sheds light on their welfare (distributional) 
implications.
In the applied trade analysis changes of regulatory measures are simulated, whereby 
scenarios often refer to the removal of possible trade barriers. The costs and benefits 
for producers and/or consumers are introduced in the model equations, and the 
simulation exercises subsequently models the producer and/or consumer behaviour in 
response to changing requirements. As many different factors may have counter-
balancing effects, the empirical underpinning of reflecting regulations and standards 
in simulation models seems to be particular important, and sensitivity analysis should 
generally be used to look into the robustness of results. Next to model parameters and 
assumptions, how regulations and standards are depicted crucially determines the 
simulation results. At the demand side, regulations and standards are reflected by 
consumers’ willingness to pay for certain product characteristics which are provided 
4 Silva and Tenreyro (2008) discuss the implementation of the Helpman et al. (2008) trade model and 
identify its dependence on the homoskedasticity assumption of all random variables as the most 
important drawback to make it practical.
5 Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) summarize various canonical mistakes in the gravity literature.
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by regulatory measures. At the supply side, simulation models usually depict 
regulations and standards as additional costs that producers incur when complying, 
but producers’ benefits should also be captured (Marette and Beghin, forthcoming). 
Like most studies applying simulation models to analyze NTMs, the following 
paragraphs take the producers’ or rather exporters’ perspective, thereby concentrating 
on regulations and standards on the supply side. 
Regulatory measures usually describe requirements for specific sectors and/or 
products in detail. In this regard, partial equilibrium (PE) models have the obvious 
advantage of capturing sectors (and policy measures) at a more disaggregated level 
than general equilibrium (GE) models. In the literature, case studies using PE models 
with a focus on the sector or even only the product affected are found, and they 
pertain to prominent cases where regulations and standards have either been changed 
or led to concerns and/or disputes between trading partner countries. The PE models 
developed in case study work may include distinct characteristics of the measures 
under review and may also present a detailed representation of the supply chain to 
provide insight on the impact of regulatory measures at different levels. Another 
strand of the literature applies GE models in a broad analysis of NTMs across 
products and countries. As Maskus et al. (2001) state, GE models can provide useful 
insights about the impact of NTMs due to their consistent representation of the entire 
economy that allows for analyzing the impact in all sectors, including the possible 
spill-over effect on those sectors that the measures under review do not directly target.
In simulation models, tariff equivalents are commonly used to model the costs of 
compliance with regulations and standards. They are obtained by various methods 
ranging from careful price comparisons to econometric estimation (see section 5.1). 
The tariff equivalents derived are introduced as wedges between the price for the 
domestic and foreign product such that this approach to depict standards and 
regulations essentially yields results similar to those of the usual analysis of tariffs, 
which are also modeled as price gaps. Unlike tariffs, regulations and standards
however do not generate tariff revenues for the importing country, and their trade and 
welfare effects have to be calculated accordingly. Being modeled as price wedges, 
regulations and standards are presented as mere border measures that cause costs 
when the respective products cross the border. From the point of view of firms that 
wish to export to foreign markets, requirements demanded by importing countries 
however lead to real trade costs that use up resources and thus affect the firms’ export 
supply function. This is captured by supply shifts using so-called iceberg tariffs that 
melt away a fixed fraction of the export value on the way from the exporting to the 
importing country, leading to reduced trade and efficiency losses for exporters. In 
comparison to price wedges, modeling iceberg tariffs result in a more pronounced 
trade effect, and the efficiency loss for exporters adds to the usual welfare loss due to 
restricted trade. For a detailed comparison of the two approaches in the GE modeling 
framework see Fugazza and Maur (2008).
The size of the supply shift in the iceberg tariff approach is usually approximated by 
estimates of tariff equivalents for regulatory measures and thus only variable 
compliance costs are captured. In order to account for the fixed compliance costs, a 
modeling framework reflecting imperfect competition is necessary and this poses 
challenges in GE models as a routinely applicable and robust approach is missing.
Imperfect competition can be rather easily introduced in PE models. The explicit 
differentiation between variable and fixed compliance costs allows for determining 
the economic impact of regulatory measures, in particular the effect of market 
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structure. In the literature on the applied simulation analysis of regulations and 
standards, Rau and van Tongeren (2007) specifically model the variable and fixed 
compliance costs of standards in an oligopolistic PE model, and apply it to EU food 
safety standards for Polish meat firms. Fixed and variable compliance costs weigh 
differently across firms, and in another contribution the authors thus employ the 
concept of heterogeneous firms; for details see Rau and van Tongeren (forthcoming).
Next to reflecting the variable and fixed costs, shifting supply functions allows for 
including features of the supply chain and the consequent analysis can be used to 
reveal winners and losers at different levels of the production and supply chain. For 
example, Lusk and Anderson (2004) use a PE simulation model to analyze how the 
domestic requirement of country-of-origin labeling affects US meat producers and 
wholesale and retail meat markets. Furthermore, the benefits of regulatory measures
can be accounted for. The benefits relating to productivity gains, reduced transaction 
and information costs, amongst others, are ideally considered in the approximation of 
the compliance costs such that the net cost increase for producers and/or exporters is 
used in the simulation models.
Producers (and consumers) in the importing country clearly benefit from import 
regulations and standards that reduce food safety risks and/or prevent disease
outbreaks and the importation of invasive species. With regard to SPS measures, these 
benefits in the importing country are taken into account in a risk-based approach. 
When modeling domestic producer benefits from import requirements on the one 
hand and the costs that the respective measure causes for exporters on the other hand, 
the resulting trade-offs can be determined in simulation analyses. For example, in the 
case of a removal or less stringent SPS import requirements, the welfare gains from 
increased trade can be offset by the possible production losses following the 
importation of invasive species or disease outbreaks in the importing country. Taking 
into account the costs and benefits of import standards and regulation in a more 
comprehensive way, such risk-based analyses can also be used to investigate the 
optimal policy response that maximizes welfare. Peterson and Orden (2008), for 
example, calculate the optimal level of food safety regulation for US imports of 
Mexican avocados accounting for the probabilities of pest infestation (fruit fly) and 
the costs for US producers (costs to prevent production losses) as well as for Mexican 
exporters (compliance costs).
The risk-based analysis of regulations and standards crucially relies on scientific 
information about the probability of an outbreak and the spread of diseases or pests. 
This combination of natural sciences/epidemiology and economics in a risk-based 
analysis is promising, but also poses major challenges given the considerable 
uncertainty about the risks and their economic consequences. In the literature, several 
case studies applying PE models conduct a risk-based analysis of import standards 
and regulations. Beghin and Bureau (2001) provide an excellent overview of existing 
studies, and important recent contributions can be added, for example Peterson and 
Orden (2008), Wilson and Antón (2006), Yue et al. (2006) and Gray et al. (2005).6
6 Note that Gray et al. (2005) apply a dynamic PE model in order to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
aflatoxin standards for US supply and demand of pistachios over a period of 50 years. Dynamic models 
allow for analyzing how the effects of regulations and standards change over time and the long-term 
impact can be determined. 
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6 Linking the analytical focus to quantification techniques
Several approaches to analyze the size and the impact of NTMs in general and 
regulations and standards in particular exist in the literature. Overall, there is no 
unifying method and the different approaches applied all have their advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of practicability, coverage and ability to capture certain 
features of regulatory measures. All regulations and standards have an impact on 
bilateral trade flows and on the welfare of concerned countries. The choice of the 
appropriate quantification technique decisively depends on the analytical focus, i.e. on 
the concrete research question of impact assessment. Table 1 gives an overview of
quantification techniques in different NTM modeling approaches, bringing together 
quantification methods and the analytical focus/research question of the analysis. The 
quantification techniques which are stated in the first two columns from the left can 
be divided into measures of size (see section 3) and impact (see section 5) of 
regulations and standards. The table gives examples of literature, and indicates 
whether the measurement method quantifies the trade impact or the price and welfare 
impact. The concrete focus of measurement or the research question of interest is 
depicted in the right column of table 1.
All gravity models aim at quantifying the trade impact of regulatory measures. 
Gravity models utilizing count measures or stringency measures (direct approach) 
focus foremost on market access and competitiveness; some studies explicitly 
determine the issues of developing countries. Employing the policy heterogeneity 
approach measuring the stringency of regulations and standards, the focus of 
measurement is on market access and competitiveness, additionally on the 
differentiation between variable and fixed compliance costs. All so far mentioned 
models use log-linear least squares estimation incorporating fixed or random effects
as the case may be. The following gravity models do not explicitly include NTMs as 
explanatory variables, but imply a general border barrier which implicitly comprises 
regulations and standards. The focus of measurement is here on methodological 
issues. When quantifying the trade impact of trade frictions using two-stage 
estimation based on Heckman (1979), the specific focus of measurement is on the 
appearance of zero trade flows or on potential unobserved firm level heterogeneity, 
taking into account the intensive and extensive margin of the trade impact of trade 
frictions, and aiming at overcoming sample selection bias. If the focus of 
measurement is on unobserved country-pair heterogeneity, multilateral resistance 
variables or fixed and random effects models are applied. Overcoming the problem of 
heteroscedasticity which may be present in trade data, appropriate quantification 
techniques are pseudo-maximum likelihood, standard Tobit, or Heckman maximum 
likelihood. 
Simulation models focus on the analysis of welfare effects of regulatory measures, 
directly modeling producer and consumer choices. Market and trade effects of 
regulations and standards are usually analyzed by including estimates of their tariff 
equivalents, which can be considered as stringency measures of NTMs as they 
allocate a numerical element to an aggregate of regulatory measures. When focusing 
on the appearance of zero trade flows caused by prohibitive regulatory measures, a 
Kuhn-Tucker approach to corner solutions is a suitable quantification technique. If 
firm heterogeneity and market structures are in the focus of measurement, tariff 
equivalents including costs of mitigation strategies against externalities can be used in 
simulation models. Simulation models can also include an additional cost term 
modeling the stringency of regulatory measures instead of tariff equivalents. This cost 
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term indicates the impact on prices. Costs and risk of a pest outbreak are included 
when focusing on a risk-based analysis for example, or compliance costs are directly 
contained, potentially differentiating between variable and fixed compliance costs, 
when focusing on market access and heterogeneous firms.
There is further room for improving the impact analysis of regulations and standards. 
As said before, the comparison of regulations and standards remains most difficult for 
regulatory measures having no cardinal or ordinal element. The quality and safety 
implication of those measures could be translated into cost structures for defining 
their stringency. Furthermore, the health and safety induction of regulatory measures 
is essential for deriving a ranking of least-trade distorting regulatory measures in the 
sense of the SPS agreement.7 Bringing the trade impact and the health and safety 
implication of regulatory measures into a relation would offer guidelines to policy 
makers on how to make use of least-trade distorting but still effective regulatory 
measures governing agri-food trade.
7 The provisions of the SPS agreement require that regulations targeting specific national agri-food 
safety objectives are minimal with respect to their trade effects (Art. 5.4) and not more trade-
restrictive than required (Art. 5.6).
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Table 1: Overview on measurement issues in different NTM modeling approaches
Quantification technique









Count measure: frequency 
and coverage ratios
Log-linear least squares with 
fixed or random effects
Disdier et al. 2008; de Frahan and 
Vancauteren 2006; Fontagné et al.
2005; Moenius 2004





Log-linear least squares with 
fixed or random effects
Wilson and Otsuki 2001; Otsuki et 
al. 2001






Log-linear least squares with 
fixed or random effects
Nardo et al. 2005; Kox and Lejour
2005; Kox and Nordås 2007
x Market access and 
competitiveness; differentiation 
between variable and fixed 
compliance costs
- Two-stage estimation based 
on Heckman (1979)
Helpman et al. 2008; Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006
x Zero trade flows; sample 
selection bias
- Two-stage estimation based 
on Heckman (1979)
Helpman et al. 2008; Silva and 
Tenreyro 2008
x Unobserved firm level 
heterogeneity - extensive and 
intensive margin; sample 
selection bias
- Multilateral resistance
variables; fixed effects and
random effects models
Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; 
Egger 2005
x Unobserved country-pair 
heterogeneity - relative trade 
barriers (multilateral resistance)
- Pseudo-maximum likelihood; 
standard Tobit; Heckman 
maximum likelihood
Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Martin 
and Pham 2008
x Heteroscedasticity in trade data
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Simulation models
Tariff equivalents: price 
effect via quantity effect




Tucker approach to 
corner solutions
Partial equilibrium model Yue and Beghin 2009 x x Zero trade flows caused by 
prohibitive regulations
Tariff equivalents: costs 
of mitigation against
externality
Partial equilibrium model Marette and Beghin forthcoming x Market and competitive 
structure - firm 
heterogeneity; costs and 
benefits of regulatory 
measures
Costs and risk of pest 
outbreak
Partial equilibrium model Peterson and Orden 2008; Wilson and 
Antón 2006; Yue, Beghin, Jenson 2006
x Risk-based analysis
Compliance costs Partial equilibrium model Rau and van Tongeren 2007, 
forthcoming
x Market access and 
competitiveness; firm 
heterogeneity; differentiation 
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